Bianca Botes, Director at Citadel Global
The United States (US) Dollar Index (DXY) has fallen to a near seven-week low, sitting just below 100, a move that cannot be attributed to a single event – it came from several forces converging simultaneously. The US Federal Reserve (Fed), Japan’s currency intervention, the softer US labour market and the US administration’s trade framework are different expressions of a single underlying dynamic. The conditions that kept the dollar elevated are softening and the US administration is not standing in the way of that.
Fed policy
The Fed held the federal funds rate at 3.50% to 3.75% on 29 July in a nine-to-three vote, with three regional Fed presidents dissenting in favour of a hike. A central bank that cannot agree internally does not project the kind of conviction that keeps a currency’s value elevated. At the rate announcement, Fed Chair, Kevin Warsh, reiterated the 2% inflation target as absolute but offered no forward guidance, so the split was the signal that markets read. Then, earlier this week, the ADP jobs report for July showed only 44,000 private-sector jobs had been added to the US economy in July – less than two-thirds of the forecast, the weakest reading since January and enough to shift the probability of a September rate hike from 67% to 57% in a single session. A cooling labour market removes the last argument for near-term tightening and pulls forward the timeline for eventual cuts, because lower rate expectations equal a lower dollar.
Japan-US Yen intervention
Into that context arrived Japan’s currency intervention. The yen hit ¥163.73/$ on 31 July, a 40-year low and what followed was not the unilateral ambush Japan’s Ministry of Finance had been preparing for. The US Treasury and Japan’s Ministry of Finance jointly bought yen on 1 August in the first bilateral yen-buying operation between the two countries since 1998. The last time both participated in any coordinated action was 2011, but that was a G7 multilateral operation aimed at weakening the yen after the Tōhoku earthquake, taking the yen in the opposite direction entirely. This week’s intervention was different in both structure and intent, US Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, confirmed the operation publicly and stated the US would do what it could to assist Japan, while US President, Donald Trump, called it a gesture of friendship. The yen moved from ¥163/$ to ¥155.20/$ at its strongest point and, at the time of writing, was trading around ¥157/$.
The funding mechanism is worth a closer look. In an interesting move, the US sold euros rather than dollars to buy yen – which means the dollar was not directly a party to the transaction. Selling euros to buy yen strengthens the yen against the euro, it does not mechanically weaken the dollar. What the euro funding did was protect the US Treasury market. Japan holds approximately $1.1 trillion in US Treasuries, in a unilateral intervention, Japan would have sold those Treasuries to raise dollars before buying yen, which would put direct upward pressure on US yields at a moment when the market is already absorbing record fiscal issuance (where the government creates or releases debt instruments to raise capital). Using euros removed that need entirely so Japan’s Treasury holdings remained intact, US long-end yields were insulated and the dollar’s weakness remained a product of the Fed split and the labour data, not the intervention.
The Mar-a-Lago Accord
That design fits the Trump administration’s broader framework. Economist and former Fed governor, Stephen Miran’s November 2024 paper – the blueprint markets now refer to as the Mar-a-Lago Accord – rests on the premise that the dollar is structurally overvalued and that correcting it is necessary to rebuild manufacturing competitiveness and narrow the trade deficit. The mechanism, while it is a contentious topic of debate, is not a formal devaluation of the greenback. It is tariffs, bilateral currency agreements and a willingness to participate in interventions that strengthen trading partners’ currencies against the dollar. A stronger yen narrows the trade deficit with Japan and reduces the competitiveness gap for US manufacturers. Bessent has maintained publicly that a strong dollar is in America’s interest – while coordinating an operation that strengthened the yen at the dollar’s expense. That contradiction sits unresolved at the centre of current US currency policy and the market is forming its own view on which side of it the administration is on.
The gold price as an indicator
When we look at the gold price, which is hovering above $4,200 this week, we need some context to understand it in the broader dollar picture. The metal peaked at $5,597/ounce in January, then sold off sharply through February and March as the Iran conflict drove oil prices higher, lifted inflation expectations and pushed real interest rate expectations up with them, causing a rather volatile environment for the precious metal, which has found itself below the $4,000/ounce level numerous times since the inception of the war.
The current gold price level is a recovery within a range, not a breakout, because gold is reclaiming the ground it lost when real rates moved against it and it is now benefitting from the same forces softening the dollar. Central banks purchased 289 tonnes of gold in the second quarter of 2026, a 62% increase year-on-year. The People’s Bank of China imported 317 tonnes in the first quarter alone, nearly three times the previous quarter’s pace. The 2022 freezing of Russian central bank assets established that dollar-denominated reserves held offshore are not unconditionally safe and that lesson has not faded. What gold is pricing right now is not simply a weaker dollar, it is the cumulative signal from a Fed that cannot tighten, an administration nudging the dollar lower through currency policy and central banks that have been quietly reducing their exposure to dollar assets for three years.
The dollar’s value is a factor of market forces, not policy
The dollar’s decline this week is not an isolated event – it is the latest move in a trend that has been building since the DXY peaked near 110 in late 2022 – the direction of travel in 2026 has been broadly lower, interrupted by episodes of strength when inflation or geopolitical risk temporarily reasserted the dollar’s safe-haven bid. That longer arc reflects a genuine shift in the conditions that supported dollar strength, now the rate differential advantage is narrowing, the fiscal position is deteriorating and the current administration is actively pursuing a trade framework that is structurally dollar negative.
None of that, however, amounts to a challenge to the dollar’s reserve currency status. The euro carries 20% of global reserves. The Chinese renminbi (official currency of China) carries less than 3%. There is no credible alternative to the dollar as the settlement currency for global trade, the denomination currency for commodity markets, or the primary reserve asset for the world’s central banks – and there will not be one in any timeframe that is relevant to current positioning. What is happening is a repricing within that dominance, not a displacement of it. The dollar can weaken 10% to 15% from its post-pandemic highs and remain, by a wide margin, the currency that the world cannot function without.
The risk is not that the dollar loses its reserve status, but that the administration mistakes a manageable repricing for a mandate to push further and discovers, as every previous administration that has tried to engineer sustained dollar weakness has discovered – that the currency eventually prices what the fundamentals demand, not what the policy prefers.
ENDS
